💥DAOs + Bankruptcy. C.R.E.A.M.💥
How long before bankruptcy professionals encounter the crypto bros?
Part I. Martin Shkreli, The Wu-Tang Clan & Mystery Buyers
Almost exactly six years ago, in December 2015, police arrested “Pharma Bro” Martin Shkreli on securities fraud charges. This triggered a sh*t-chain of events including (i) the chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of KaloBios Pharmaceuticals Inc., a biotech company helmed by Shkreli, and (ii) Shkreli’s conviction on two counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The US District Court Judge overseeing the case ruled that Mr. Shkreli would, in addition to paying $388k in restitution and a $75k fine, have to forfeit money he made from his fraud. The bill? $7.4mm.
Earlier that year, Mr. Shkreli spent a reported $2mm for a unique one-of-a-kind 31-track Wu-Tang Clan album titled Once Upon a time in Shaolin. The question quickly became: what would happen to this album? Was Mr. Shkreli liquid enough to manage the forfeiture amount or would he have to start divesting of assets — including this mysterious piece of hip hop memorabilia…?
⚡️Spoiler alert: the latter.⚡️
In July 2021, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York announced that it had sold the Wu-Tang album:
Earlier today, the United States sold the sole copy of the Wu-Tang Clan album “Once Upon a Time in Shaolin” (the “Album”) which had previously been ordered to be forfeited as a substitute asset in connection with the approximately $7.4 million forfeiture money judgment (Forfeiture Money Judgment) entered against Shkreli at his March 2018 sentencing. Proceeds from the sale of the Album will be applied to satisfy the outstanding balance owed on the Forfeiture Money Judgment. The contract of sale contains a confidentiality provision that protects information relating to the buyer and price. (emphasis added)
The initial question was: who was this mysterious buyer protected by confidentiality?
The right question was: what was this mysterious buyer?
Part II. We Da(o) People.
In November 2021, another rare asset went up for auction: a copy of the United States Constitution.
A quick history lesson: apparently, in 1787, the Founding Fathers only commissioned 500 copies of the final text of the US Constitution. Of those, only 11 or 13 copies remain in existence. All of the copies — with the exception of the one up for auction — are owned by institutions like the National Archives Museum. A woman named Dorothy Goldman owned the particular copy at issue here and she sought to sell it and use the proceeds to finance democracy education (commendable). Sotheby’s won the right to conduct the auction. Upon hearing about this auction, a careening cyberspace caravan of crypto cognoscenti decided they wanted to own the thing and put it “back in the hands of the people” — never mind that 9 of the 11 other existing copies are held by public institutions. But let’s not get caught up in technicalities.
But, speaking of technicalities, rather than do a conventional old crowdfunding campaign, this cohort decided that — in merely a week’s time — they’d launch a DAO and use that as the vehicle through which to launch a bid for this historical document.
What the holy f*ck is a DAO? Glad you asked.
We’re going to over-simplify the hell out of this but, generally speaking, a DAO is a “decentralized autonomous organization” which is a fancy way of saying that the crypto bros are attempting to reinvent a corporation. They can take on a number of forms: there are, among other kinds, Protocol DAOs (collaborative entities that exist to help build a protocol), Social DAOs (built around community), Grant DAOs (focused on patronage, these DAOs support promising tech projects, i.e., web3) and, most significantly for our purposes, Investment DAOs. Per Mario Gabriele in The Generalist:
Investment DAOs are mostly about the returns. Similar to The DAO — that first, ill-fated investment entity — the goal of these projects is to aggregate capital and investors for deployment. Unlike traditional venture firms, decision-making is effectively democratic, with LPs voting on relevant opportunities.
Often, different investing DAOs will have different focuses. For example, one might specialize in purchasing ENS names, another might hone in on blockchain gaming, while a third could fund crypto startups.
That all said, no matter the type, DAOs all generally share the same fundamental DNA. They:
📍are transparent computer programs run on a blockchain (typically Ethereum) and controlled by organization members rather than a central corporate entity (in other words, they’re purportedly — though not always, in reality — run from the bottom up rather than top down);
📍revolve around smart “trustless” contracts with embedded cryptographic instructions that automatically execute when pre-established conditions are met;
📍establish native tokens to be used by the DAO for voting/governance or to incentivize various activities (in other words, a token entitles a vote);
📍sell native tokens to build up a treasury to be deployed in a way consistent with the DAO’s underlying consensus.*
The token piece is interesting because tokens can be doled out to the architects of the DAO at first but then they can also be purchased by people who believe in the mission of the DAO. Again, here, that mission was to secure one of the last remaining copies of the US Constitution. The token they used was unironically named $PEOPLE (which, uh, awkwardly meant that a supporter would literally own PEOPLE…bleh). And, to make a long story short, there were A LOT of people who bought into this mission. So many, in fact, that the ConstitutionDAO (as it became known) nearly pulled this motherf*cker off — despite having to cobble together multiple pieces on an extremely aggressive timeline. Here is Packy McCormick breaking some of that down:
How did this play out? Packy subsequently wrote:
Last Thursday, a couple of people saw that a copy of the Constitution was going up for auction. Sunday, a DAO was set up and contributors were contributing. By Thursday, we bid up to $40 million for the document at Sotheby’s before losing to Ken Griffin.
ConstitutionDAO itself was a beneficiary of both software composability and idea composability. The core team was able to snap together existing pieces like ETH, Juicebox, Discord, Twitter, meme formats (📜,📜), DAO legal structures, people’s understanding of crowdfunding, and their vague understanding of DAOs to create something out of nothing in a matter of days and pull in $47 million from 17,482 people in less than a week.
(emphasis in original)
That’s right: in a matter of days, the ConstitutionDAO was able to accomplish a lot of the steps delineated above and raise upwards of $47mm in funds from supporters and give a billionaire a run for his money (well, sort of).
Not to paint this as all glory and hallelujah, what happened next was a complete and utter clusterf*ck:
…basically, at any given moment a few dozen people are beefing with each other in the Discord’s “general” section about whether or not ConstitutionDAO is now a scam, whether they’ve been “rugged” (had their money taken), the intentions of the core team, what should happen next, whether this is just an unfortunate situation caused by disorganization and the speed at which everything happened, etc. This is mixed in with a bunch of people earnestly asking how they can get their money back, how to claim $PEOPLE tokens, what document they should try to buy next, etc.
LOL. Decentralization, huh? Community, right? There’s still a lot of work to do. And then there is the economic component:
In its "how to donate" video, a member of ConstitutionDAO …"recommend[ed] [that donors] add about $150 to $200 more than you'd like to contribute" to their donations to pay gas fees, which are transaction fees on the Ethereum network. Motherboard contributed a small amount of money to the project to see how this would play out in practice. Here is how it worked:
ConstitutionDAO accepted only ether, the token on Ethereum. For someone to convert USD to $PEOPLE tokens, the process had several steps. First, we had to buy Ethereum on an exchange (we used Coinbase). We bought $200 worth of Ethereum. Coinbase took a $3 fee. Then, we had to send the Ethereum from Coinbase to a MetaMask crypto wallet. To do this, we had to pay a $12 network fee. Then, we had to send the Ethereum from MetaMask to Juicebox. So-called "gas" fees vary wildly and depend on how busy the Ethereum network is at any given moment and the complexity of the transaction. Right now, gas fees on Ethereum are very high, and a highly complex operation could end up costing hundreds of dollars in fees. In our case, we paid a $75 gas fee to contribute roughly $75 to the project. Of the initial $200 we bought in ETH, $90 was eaten up in fees simply to donate to ConstitutionDAO.
Motherboard was not alone in paying exorbitant fees to simply donate to ConstitutionDAO. The total cost in fees for donating to the project was nearly $1 million, with much of the cost being borne by people donating relatively small amounts (because the fees are paid per transaction, meaning people who donated huge sums of money paid a lower amount, percentage wise, when donating).
In order to get a refund, we have to do this in reverse, basically. And so to get our ETH back from Juicebox, we would have to pay gas fees again, meaning essentially the entirety of the amount invested would be wiped out.
And that's the rub. About half of all people who contributed to ConstitutionDAO are in this exact same boat, according to ConstitutionDAO itself. Admins posted on Discord immediately following the auction that "we had 17,437 donors, with a median donation size of $206.26. A significant percentage of these donations came from wallets that were initialized for the first time."
This means that about half of all people who donated to ConstitutionDAO are now going to either lose basically everything they put into Ethereum network fees or will have to become a supporter of an organization that tried to buy the Constitution, failed, and now essentially has no purpose.
Aside from these financial issues, all of this raises all kinds of serious questions about the practicality of DAOs — legal questions,** governance questions,*** efficiency questions,**** etc. Which, naturally, leaves the door ajar for trolls:
But there also remains room for the optimists:
Including the Chairman and Worldwide Head of Sales of Sotheby’s itself:
ConstitutionDAO (📜, 📜) @ConstitutionDAOhttps://t.co/6GVxlkvJbj
Here we return to Packy. He wrote:
ConstitutionDAO created another idea lego. In the past few days on Twitter, I’ve seen proposals of varying seriousness to launch DAOs to buy NFL teams, soccer (football?) clubs, the Empire State Building, fossil fuel companies, to buy and decentralize businesses, and to raise money for worthy causes. These ideas will get bigger and more impactful. The design space has opened up.
The next DAOs to launch will have a built-in advantage. The fact that DAOs operate more openly and publicly than a traditional company means that its lessons, positive and negative, are more easily composable. Even the (necessary, given time constraints) shortcomings -- like telegraphing our max bid in a public wallet, not being able to fractionalize ownership for regulatory reasons, and dealing with high gas fees -- gave builders new things to work on and provided the next DAO a clearer roadmap. ConstitutionDAO itself is using the learnings to adjust as it heads into its second chapter. (emphasis in original)
It is early.
Part III. Fore! DAOs are Proliferating
Packy forgot to mention an NBA team too. And this:
That’s right: as of about two weeks ago, there’s now a DAO that’s set up to create “the modern golf & leisure club”:
It very quickly sold out memberships via NFTs minted on New Year’s Day:
At the time of this writing, ETH is quoted at around $3,800…
…which means LinksDAO raised ~$11mm from 4700 people like that *snaps fingers.* 🤌
What did these people buy with their $11mm? More or less f*ck all.***** Ok, ok, governance rights. Or something.
And that’s really about all for now. Are the people forking over $11mm even reading these terms ⬇️ ? They’re comical.
Terms Shmerms. Whatever. That’s not the point. Web3 magical pixie dust is the point, y’all!
Indeed, the point is that there are a lot of people thinking about the future use case for DAOs, looking to build off of the ConstitutionDAO experience:
The Hustle @TheHustleShould @theSamParr and @ShaanVP buy Michael Jordan's house and turn it into a Michael Jordan museum? I say yes. https://t.co/qeyo2YCilq
In his latest missive, Packy, speaking of the inevitable evolution of DAOs, writes:
In less than two months, we’ve gone from ConstitutionDAO proving it was possible to raise $47 million from 17,000 people in less than a week to LinksDAO raising $11.8 million to buy a golf course and create an online/offline membership experience. OpenAccessDAO wants to buy and open source academic research papers. BlimpDAO wants to buy one of the world’s 25 blimps. KrauseHouse wants to buy an NBA team. FriesDAO wants to buy fast-food franchises. GasDAO airdropped tokens to people based on how much they’ve paid in gas on Ethereum – a proxy for usage – and wants to turn that group into a coordinated body with a say in the future of Ethereum.
On the surface, existing DAOs range from potentially important to silly to downright dumb. But each one is an experiment in coordinating large groups of strangers around a shared mission, and many add new tricks to the pot.
Do we need a DAO to buy a Subway? Probably not. But FriesDAO is pushing the boundary on how to structure and operate a decentrally owned and governed group of real-world businesses, each with their own P&L.
The P&L piece is notable. After all, there’s currently over $15b in AUM sitting on DAO balance sheets. These things — for all their kinks — don’t seem to be going away. A lot of them will be money-grab scams.
Part IV. PleasrDAO Stans Wu-Tang
And so we return here to Mr. Shkreli, our favorite judgment debtor. The US government effectively stepped in to his shoes as trustee and sold the assets of his estate to satisfy the outstanding judgment. As we noted above, the sale was predicated upon strict confidentiality. But, in October, we learned that the buyer was an entity called PleasrDAO and that it paid $4mm for the asset. For your viewing enjoyment, here is the whitest dude on the planet c.r.e.a.m.ing his pants over a limited edition Wu-Tang album ⬇️:
PleasrDAO describes itself as “a collective of DeFi leaders, early NFT collectors and digital artists,” on its website, adding “the DAO has evolved and elevated its mission to collect digital art that represents and funds important ideas, movements and causes that have been memorialized on-chain as NFTs.”
Uh, ok. That doesn’t in any way describe a physical album by the Wu-Tang Clan, but we think we see where PleasrDAO may be headed with their purchase….
Part V. It Seems Like It’s Just a Matter of Time.
So now that we’ve gotten that ridiculously long preface out of the way, y’all should be asking the following question: what is a relatively lightweight way for a DAO full of stans to get involved in bankruptcies?
icebergy ❄️ @icebergy_We should buy circuit city to compete with tai’s RadioShack uniswap clone
DING. DING. DING. Brands.
If only there were those types of opportunities in or around bankruptcy:
Indeed, given the seemingly-imminent rise of the metaverse, the increased emphasis on micro-communities, and the internet’s ability to pull like-minded people together quickly over even the dumbest of sh*t, the purchase of bankrupted brand IP by DAOs seems to be the perfect test case — provided you assume away the sophistication required to flow through the steps noted above, e.g., setting up a Coinbase account, buying Ether, transferring that Ether to a crypto wallet like MetaMask****** or Rainbow, linking that wallet to the DAO treasury for transfer processing and token transfer, etc. The sheer thought of a Jessica Simpson fan pulling all of that off is laughable, to say the least (don’t @ us). While not probable, it is, at least, possible. Jessica Simpson super fans could then collectively decide — by way of their governance tokens — what to do with the brand. The possibilities are endless: they could issue non-fungible tokens; license the brand name to video games and, taking a page out of Steph Curry’s book, sell virtual apparel, shoes, and beauty products. A DAO for this purpose would — if the ConstitutionDAO is any indication — have plenty of time to get set up given the notice periods typically baked into a bankruptcy sale process. Alternatively, in an effort to achieve more perfect code/governance in the smart contracts, this DAO could get set up in advance and effectively act as distressed asset buyer hunting for acquisition opportunities — akin, in some respects to a SPAC. Except without the need to go public and charge the onerous “sponsor promote.” LOL, who are we kidding? Of course DAOs tend to allocate what might seem like a generous amount of proceeds to “operational expenses” or, more blatantly, give the “core team” a token distribution.
Anyway, for those of you who are unfamiliar with the bankruptcy sale and auction process, it goes something like this:
A debtor company files for bankruptcy indicating that it will pursue a sale of all or substantially all of its assets;
The debtor files a motion seeking bankruptcy court approval of sale and bidding procedures (the “Bidding Procedures Motion);
The Bidding Procedures Motion may, if applicable, seek approval of a “stalking horse bidder” — a floor bidder who has taken the time to negotiate the terms of an asset purchase agreement, the financial and legal terms of which will serve as the basis for subsequent bids;
The Bidding Procedures Motion may also establish a “break-up fee” and “expense reimbursement” to said stalking horse bidder as reward/compensation for doing that initial work;
Assuming approval of the Bidding Procedures Motion and entry of a bankruptcy court order (the “Bidding Procedures Order”), the debtor, through its retained investment banker and/or financial advisor, will continue to market the assets, opening up a data room to interested parties who’ve subjected themselves to non-disclosure agreements;
Per the Bidding Procedures Order, prospective bidders will have until a date certain to make a “qualified bid.” Typically a qualified bid is established when a bidder can show it is a duly formed legal entity, has committed financing, can otherwise consummate a sale, etc.
To the extent that a bid is deemed “qualified,” the debtor will conduct an auction and pursuant to pre-approved bidding increments, interested parties will submit bids and the debtor will choose the highest or best offer in an effort to maximize value to the bankruptcy estate.
The debtor will then seek court approval of the sale to the winning bidder. The winning bidder will be required to make a deposit. Typically, the second highest bidder also submits a deposit in the event that the winner drops the ball or balks.*******
All of this falls under bankruptcy code section 363 which has the added benefit of transferring assets to a buyer free and clear of any prior liens and encumbrances and, assuming good faith, insulating said buyer from successor liability. Sometimes buyers insist on a bankruptcy filing in advance of a sale to (a) get these protections and (b) avoid any sort of clawback litigation.
Generally speaking: a lot of the aforementioned procedure mumbo jumbo means f*ck all if — as in the recent Hertz and Limetree Bay sale processes — a well-intentioned and capitalized buyer presents itself just prior to the bankruptcy court approving a sale. If there’s one guarantee in bankruptcy, it’s that money ALWAYS trumps process.******** Now may be a good time for an interlude of Wu-Tang’s “Cash Rules Everything Around Me”:
Now is also probably a good time to note that Sotheby’s had no problem qualifying ConstitutionDAO as a qualified participant. 🤔
Part VI. The Brand Push has Already Begun.
Speaking of brands and bankruptcy, there’s currently a push to form a DAO to make a move on the Blockbuster brand. That’s right: Blockbuster. We wrote about its bankruptcy three years ago here ⬇️.
Because if any brand should find a home on the blockchain, well…we suppose that would be Block-buster. #dadjoke.
This one seems pretty damn pie-in-the-sky. Unsolicited and out of seemingly nowhere, this DAO wants to engage in discussions with Dish, Blockbuster’s current owner, about the terms of an acquisition. You can read all about it in this thread ⬇️ here or check out the Discord channel here.
Already the account has over 11.4k Twitter followers and thousands of members of the Discord channel. It’s early days, but clearly there are people who are interested in this cockamamie idea.
It’s only a matter of time before some of them set their sights on a debtor.
Part VII. DAOs as Strategic Buyers
We recently wrote that financial advisory and investment banking shops ought to consider leaning in to the meme stock trend by building out teams they could deploy to advise management teams on how best to capture the craziness currently transpiring in nearly all corners of the market these days. We wrote:
So shouldn’t restructuring firms, as Levine suggests, “embrace” all of this? Doesn’t teaching a company how to lean into meme-stonkification classify as some form of “performance improvement”?
We’re old enough to remember when bankruptcy groups were just bankruptcy groups. Now they’re “Business Finance & Restructuring” or “Business Solutions, Governance, Restructuring & Bankruptcy” groups. Investment banks no longer provide “Restructuring Advisory” services; rather, they provide “Liability Management” services. That’s a larger umbrella and is far less daunting to the casual management team. Who’s going to be first to market with their “Liability & Meme Management” service line or “Business Solutions, Meming & Anti-Governance.”
We know. This sounds insane. But never underestimate the power of the almighty fee. And as things stand right now, there very well may be some money to be made here.
Even as we re-read that ⬆️, we can’t help but chuckle. On one hand, maybe we’re not wrong? 🤷♀️ On the other hand, it just sounds so utterly ridiculous. Maybe we’re just meeting the moment.
That said, perhaps there’s something to investment banks figuring out ways to encourage the establishment of DAOs. Should the Stifel banking team have engaged in all kinds of Jessica Simpson fan forums and tried to encourage the formation of a DAO for purposes of acquiring her brand? After all, their whole mandate is to drum up the highest or best offer in bankruptcy court. And typically banker fees are a percentage of proceeds so they’re incentivized to think outside the box.
But would a bankruptcy court be on board with a DAO swooping in with a potential qualified bid for brand IP? Again, as we’ve seen from Limetree Bay, Hertz, and other sale scenarios, conventional rules and wisdom easily fly out the bankruptcy court door when there’s more cash on the table. We assume that there’s no reason why a court wouldn’t approve a DAO-led purchase if the DAO is able to demonstrate that it has the funds to complete a transaction.
Will this happen in 2022? 2023? Given all the craziness that took place in 2021, it really wouldn’t surprise us if it happened sooner rather than later. At least while the markets remain frothy AF and people have nothing else to do with their money….
*Like we said, above, this rabbit hole runs DEEEEEEEEP.
**This is yet another example of technology outpacing the law. And so the structure of Investment DAOs is very much something of a work-in-progress. “DAO First” entities — what we would call naked DAOs — potentially expose members to meaningful liability risk. This is because they’re treated like a general partnership with flowthrough liability and joint and several liability.
Good luck collecting any judgments from foreign members who are, aside from being potentially anonymous and identifiable only by virtue of their crypto wallet address, jurisdictionally insulated from the long-arm of US law.
And so, generally, DAOs need to be wrapped in a corporate form, like a state-law based LLC. Wyoming appears to be the most ahead of the curve here, openly welcoming DAO structures. But with Investment DAOs, federal implications and limitations nevertheless apply. As just one example, to avoid “inadvertent investment company” status under the 40’ Act, an Investment DAO is limited to 99 stakeholders (all of whom must be accredited investors). If a company is deemed to be an inadvertent investment company, there could be significant penalties, prohibitions on interstate commerce, and contractual challenges. This sums up some of the other issues (e.g., ‘34 Act and/or AML/KYC) nicely.
The structure was highly relevant in the case of ConstitutionDAO. Bloomberg’s Matt Levine wrote:
People are interested in the legal structure of this thing. Basically it seems like there is a Delaware limited liability company that will take ownership of the document (if they win the auction), and there’s a tax-exempt organization called Endaoment that will act as the LLC’s “fiscal sponsor” and actually buy the document from the auction house and hold it on behalf of the LLC. These are normal legal entities, and the LLC’s members — in effect, the legal owners — are some of the humans who have promoted the DAO.
But the DAO itself is a decentralized autonomous organization, a blockchain thing with governance tokens that can vote on what the DAO will do and smart contracts to aggregate those votes. And the connection between the DAO and the LLC is a little vague:
The LLC is currently legally owned by DAO community members Alice Ma and Julian Weisser, who are representing the wider DAO community for this agreement. The DAO will advise the LLC owners on all actions taken. This structure is intended to be temporary and can be changed according to the DAO community’s wishes after the auction is complete.
“Advise.” You can vote your governance tokens in the DAO, and then the two particular humans who run the LLC that owns the copy of the Constitution will take your votes under advisement. It’s not quite the sort of trustless decentralized blah blah blah that crypto promises.
So what’s to stop those two humans from running off with the money, or the Constitution? 5 The answer absolutely cannot be “the immutable code of a smart contract on the blockchain,” because the Constitution is a piece of paper (parchment? whatever) that does not live on the blockchain, and a smart contract cannot stop someone from pocketing it and walking away. (And since the money for the purchase needs to be in dollars in a dumb old bank account, the smart contract probably can’t stop someone from stealing it either.)
Conceivably the answer is “the DAO is actually a limited liability company under Delaware law, and the LLC agreement and Delaware law constrain the members of the LLC to do what the DAO says.” It’s not clear to me whether or not this is the case. It is tricky to do that, but a lot of lawyers are very much working on things like this, mechanisms to integrate DAOs and crypto-token voting into traditional business-entity and contract law. (Wyoming has a “DAO LLC” legal entity, though ConstitutionDAO chose not to use it.) Eventually one assumes that a world of crypto companies will have to operate like this: There will be smart contracts on the blockchain, and legal entities that carry out the smart contracts’ desires in the real world, and there will be well-understood interfaces between them, and statutes and case law that allow the smart contracts to govern the entities and so forth.
But right now I suspect the main legal answer is the backup answer 6 : If they pocket the money, that sure looks like wire fraud, and the DAO investors can probably sue for fraud and also probably get prosecutors interested. The enforcement mechanism is: “If you market a thing with promises, and raise a lot of money from strangers based on those promises, you’d better try hard to do what you promised or you’ll get in trouble for fraud.” Not always! In particular, if you are ripping people off on the blockchain, there’s a decent chance that courts and prosecutors will laugh at your victims rather than throwing the book at you. But if you raise enough money in a high-profile enough way, you should probably try to do what you say you’ll do.
Solving for governance and coordinated decision making at scale is one of the hardest problems DAOs face today.
Why is it so hard?
One of the great unlocks of web3 is its censorship resistance and “permissionless accessibility”. In other words, anyone, anywhere can transact with each other or engage in decentralized protocols and applications without third-party interference. No government should be able to stop you joining a DAO, for example. (At least, in theory.)
This permissionless access can be a double-edged sword at times, particularly as DAOs grow and scale. Without hard caps on membership, DAOs often become larger and more diverse over time. Eventually, popular DAOs may have membership numbering in the tens of thousands, with each individual bringing differing skills, experiences, values, opinions, and backgrounds to the table.
To be clear, this is a good problem to have. That web3 enables individuals to transition from laborer to owner is one of its most fundamental, and compelling attributes. But as communities grow ever more decentralized, the need for robust governance increases — otherwise you may end up with a splintered organization in which every participant is merely screaming into the wind.
****Fair points ⬇️:
This RIGHTFULLY highly skeptical interview doesn’t exactly inspire a lot of confidence as to why any of this really needs to be done on-chain (but we have to assume that, since a lot of really smart people are focused on this area, that Packy is right, and that the ConstitutionDAO was just a lower-tier lego to be built upon).
Anyway, this thread by Anil Dash really cuts to the heart of the efficiency question. Notably, Kickstarter — the OG of crowdfunding — announced that it’s building its own decentralized crypto-fueled crowdfunding platform.
*****These DAOs are beginning to make SPACs look good. Here’s LinksDAO’s roadmap:
That has about the same level of certainty as purchasing a dime bag from a hobo. The use of proceeds demonstrates how DAOs are, operationally speaking, not much more efficient than any other capital raising vehicle:
******Though adoption of Meta Mask is skyrocketing:
*******Clearly the issue the ConstitutionDAO had with refunds might also be problematic in the case where a DAO loses an auction.
********The Hertz purchase appears to have paid off handsomely for Certares Management and Knighthead Capital Management.
Colby Whitlow (Senior Director) joined SierraConstellation Partners from FTI Consulting.
Joe Ruskey (Associate) joined McDermott Will & Emery from Kirkland & Elis LLP.
Stuart Miles (Senior Associate) joined SierraConstellation Partners from Morgan Stanley.
Alyssa Russell on her promotion to Senior Managing Associate at Sidley Austin LLP.
Chad Valerio on his promotion to Head of Opportunistic Credit at Onex Credit.
Chris Haeckel on his promotion to Senior Vice President at AlixPartners.
Daniel Brosious on his promotion to Senior Managing Director at FTI Consulting.
David Shim on his promotion to Vice President at Greenhill & Co.
Jason Leshner on his promotion to Vice President at GLC Advisors & Co. LLC.
Josh Gruenbaum on his promotion to Director at KKR & Co. Inc.
Sean Cannon on his promotion to Managing Director at GLC Advisors & Co. LLC.
Zachary Barbieri on his promotion to Director at M3 Partners.
Turnarounds & Workouts’ “Outstanding Restructuring Lawyers for 2021” including Justin Bernbrock from Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, Amy Caton from Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, Matthew Clemente from Sidley Austin LLP, Andrew Glenn from Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes, Scott Greenberg from Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Kristopher Hansen from Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, Marshall Heubner from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Jeffrey Jonas from Brown Rudnick LLP, Ross Kwasteniet from Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Arik Preis from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Sandy Qusba from Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Caroline Reckler from Latham & Watkins LLP, Matthew Stein from Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, Rachel Strickland from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, and Louis Strubeck from O’Melveny & Myers LLP.
We have compiled a list of a$$-kicking resources on the topics of restructuring, tech, finance, investing, and disruption. 💥You can find it here💥.
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